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Abstract
This paper uses a principal/agent framework to analyze consumer bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy discharge partly insures risk-averse borrowers against bad income
realizations but also reduces the borrower’s incentive to avoid insolvency. Among
our results are the following: (a) high bankruptcy exemptions increase bankruptcy
insurance but at the cost of reducing the borrower’s incentives to stay solvent;
(b) reaffirmations—renegotiations—have ambiguous efficiency effects in general,
but the right to renegotiate is especially valuable for relatively poor persons;
(c) giving consumers the ex post choice regarding which bankruptcy chapter to use
also provides more insurance but, by making bankruptcy softer on debtors, has poor
incentive effects; and (d) serious consideration should be given to expanding the
scope of consumers’ ability to contract about bankruptcy because trade-offs be-




A very large fraction of bankruptcy filings each year are by consumers,
the number of consumer filings per year is steadily increasing, and con-
sumer bankruptcy is a hot, and controversial, political issue. Consumer
bankruptcy, however, has received little theoretical analysis despite its prac-
tical and political significance. The four dissenters (out of nine members)
to the recent Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
(NBRC) thus remarked on ‘‘the need for a coherent theory of consumer
bankruptcy,’’1 and an empirical study published recently stated: ‘‘But de-
* Adler is at School of Law, New York University; Polak is at Department of Economics,
Yale University; Schwartz is at School of Law, Yale University. This paper was improved
by comments at the conference Political Economy of Contractual Obligations: The Case of
Bankruptcy Law, Lake Arrowhead, California, April 1999; by workshops at the University
of Florida College of Business and the Case Western Law School; and by suggestions from
Ian Ayres, Andrew Guzman, Eric Posner, Howard Rosenthal, and George Triantis.
1 The NBRC was appointed by Congress to recommend to it reforms of the Bankruptcy
Code. A number of recent reform bills have been introduced in Congress in the last 2
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spite the importance of personal bankruptcy, the subject has been almost
completely neglected by economists.’’2 This paper is an early effort to un-
cover some of the theoretical issues.
To better understand the gap we attempt to fill, realize that most of the
scholarship on business bankruptcy has taken an ex post focus, concentrat-
ing on what should be done after a firm has become insolvent. In this con-
text, there is an uncontroversial goal and a consensus on the need for regu-
lation to achieve it. The goal is to continue the insolvent firm as an
economic entity if its going concern value exceeds its liquidation value.
When this inequality is unsatisfied, the firm should be liquidated piecemeal.
Regulation may be necessary because the goal of an individual creditor is
to maximize its insolvency state payoff. Sometimes this is best done by
promptly suing a debt to judgment and seizing particular assets of the firm.
When more than one creditor acts on this incentive, the likely equilibrium
is for all insolvent firms to be liquidated. Therefore, a bankruptcy system
that stays collection and then weighs going concern and liquidation values
is necessary to achieve ex post efficiency.
There is no similar ex post efficiency paradigm for consumer bankruptcy.
The insolvent consumer cannot be liquidated, but rather will continue on,
doing what he had done. Also, if there is a collective action problem, it
must take a different form than it takes for business bankruptcy. To see
why, suppose there were no bankruptcy procedure and one creditor rushed
to judgment, seizing most of the insolvent consumer’s assets. This would
injure the other creditors, but the injury is only a wealth transfer. As just
said, the consumer will go on as before, whether one creditor takes the
lion’s share or the creditors share ratably. What then is the ex post effi-
ciency goal that a consumer bankruptcy system should pursue? What im-
pediments to the realization of that goal must the system eliminate? These
questions seldom are asked.
Business bankruptcy scholarship has only recently devoted serious atten-
tion to ex ante efficiency. From an ex ante point of view, a bankruptcy sys-
tem can be regarded as a term in a lending agreement. The issues are what
optimal ‘‘bankruptcy terms’’ would look like and whether the private par-
ties could agree on them.3 Scholars also have asked whether firms do, or
years. See 1 Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997). The Report cites
much of the legal literature relating to consumer bankruptcy.
2 Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz, & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and Credit
Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. Econ. 217 (1997).
3 See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.
J. 1807 (1998); Alan Schwartz, Contracting about Bankruptcy, 13 J. L. Econ. & Org. 127
(1997).
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free from legal constraint might, choose capital structures or corporate char-
ters that take bankruptcy into account.4 In contrast, apart from occasional
suggestions that bankruptcy partially insures consumers against bad income
realizations, consumer bankruptcy scholarship has neglected ex ante effi-
ciency altogether. As it happens, consumer bankruptcy is best justified as
partial wage insurance,5 but then the issue is whether current bankruptcy
procedures resemble an optimal insurance contract against personal insol-
vency. This issue has been almost entirely neglected. We therefore write on
a relatively clean slate and will raise more questions in this paper than we
answer.
B. The Consumer Bankruptcy System
A consumer borrower has a nonwaivable right to bankruptcy relief and
a choice as to the form that relief can take. When the debtor files for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, he must give up his nonex-
empt assets6 to his creditors in return for a discharge of his debts. After a
Chapter 7 discharge, the borrower emerges from bankruptcy with all of his
exempt assets and all of his human capital. Alternatively, a debtor can file
for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. This debtor must propose a plan, accept-
able to the bankruptcy court, under which he can keep his exempt and non-
exempt assets, but he must pay all of his ‘‘disposable income’’ to his credi-
tors in installments. The present value of these installments must at least
equal the value of the debtor’s nonexempt assets. A Chapter 13 repayment
plan is supposed to last for 3–5 years. As this sketch suggests, a debtor will
4 See Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343 (1997);
Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 Stan-
ford L. Rev. 311 (1993); Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, Bankruptcy and Agency
Costs: Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 23 J. Fin. & Quan.
Analysis 27 (1988). See also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Texas L. Rev. 51 (1992).
5 Wage insurance apparently is not sold in standard insurance markets. Current analyses
now show that many individuals do not hold sufficient financial assets to permit complete
consumption smoothing. See, for example, George M. Constantinides & Darrell Duffie, Asset
Pricing with Heterogenous Consumers, 104 J. Pol. Econ. 219 (1996); Alon Brav, George M.
Constantinides, & Christopher C. Geczy, Asset Pricing with Heterogenous Consumers and
Limited Participation: Empirical Evidence (unpublished manuscript, Univ. Chicago, Grad.
Sch. Bus. 1999).
6 Bankruptcy law partitions a debtor’s assets into two classes, those that creditors cannot
reach (exempt assets) and those that creditors can reach (nonexempt assets). It also is com-
mon to put a monetary limit on exemptions. For example, the debtor’s home usually is ex-
empt, but a state may restrict the exemption to equity worth no more than $20,000. The
Bankruptcy Code itself contains a set of exemptions, but it also permits the states to choose
their own exemption categories and levels. A majority of states have done so.
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 12:37:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
588 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
file under Chapter 13 when he values his nonexempt assets more than the
fraction of his future earnings that the court-approved plan will require him
to give up.7
Several reforms of the consumer bankruptcy system have been intro-
duced in Congress in recent years. Some reformers would like to increase
the federal exemption level and make it binding on the states. This would
permit most consumers to emerge from bankruptcy with more property than
they can today. After bankruptcy, some consumers ‘‘reaffirm,’’ and thereby
reinstate, certain debts in order to retain property a creditor could otherwise
seize or to increase the chance of obtaining more credit from a particular
creditor. The NBRC believes that consumers often reaffirm debts unwisely
and that the relatively poor are particularly prone to exploitation in re-
negotiations. Similar views support the current extensive regulation of re-
affirmations (for example, a renegotiation bargain must be approved by
the bankruptcy court). The NBRC recently recommended reforms that
would eliminate reaffirmations altogether.8 Other reformers sometimes
argue that consumers should be permitted to waive their right to, or agree
to conditions on, a bankruptcy discharge (in order to obtain a lower inter-
est rate). In another vein, a number of commentators now advocate
‘‘needs-based’’ bankruptcy. Under such a system, an insolvent debtor
whose future income is expected to be above a statutorily set level would
be required to use Chapter 13. The object here, often cast in moral terms,
is to prevent a consumer with relatively few nonexempt assets and high
expected earnings from painlessly discharging a large amount of debt.
As an illustration, consider a debtor who has $50,000 in nonexempt assets,
has debts of $350,000, and will earn $100,000 per year after bankruptcy.
This debtor can file under Chapter 7, sell his debt to his creditors for
one-seventh of its face value, and retain his future income. It is arguably
more equitable to force the debtor to use Chapter 13, which would require
him to share much of his future income with creditors. The desirability of
these currently proposed reforms and others could be better assessed were
there a more solidly grounded theoretical understanding of consumer bank-
ruptcy.
7 A recent empirical analysis stated, ‘‘The data clearly suggest that . . . Chapter 13 debtors
are protecting asset holdings by their choice of chapter.’’ Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain,
Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice: Evidence from the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J.
Legal Stud. 461, 472 (1999).
8 The NBRC recommended that reaffirmations of unsecured debt be prohibited and that
reaffirmations of secured debt be limited to the wholesale value of the collateral. Since the
secured creditor could realize the wholesale value by repossessing, it probably would reject
a deal to be paid no more than that value in installments.
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C. Tentative Results and Open Questions
The Bankruptcy Code is a mandatory term in the lending agreement.
When credit markets are competitive, as we suppose, the borrower side gets
the entire ex ante surplus that credit makes possible. This implies that the
private and socially efficient outcomes are the same: a borrower prefers the
contract that maximizes his expected surplus, and this contract also will
maximize expected social surplus (if there are no externalities). Turning to
the borrower’s preferences, many scholars and reformers believe that insol-
vency is exogenous: the consumer borrower becomes insolvent through no
fault of his own, in consequence of job loss, illness, or the like.9 On this
assumption, we first show the standard result that when insurance is actuari-
ally fair and consumers are risk averse, the efficient contract insures the
borrower fully. A Chapter 7 discharge is not full insurance: the debtor is
‘‘paid’’ the value of his unpaid debts but not the full loss he may incur from
a bad income realization. Were the Bankruptcy Code to become a default,
borrowers thus would reject contracts that waived discharge unless they re-
ceived an appropriate risk premium. Needs-based bankruptcy also would be
ex ante inefficient in a world of exogenous bankruptcy because it would
require wealthier borrowers to pay their disposable future income to credi-
tors for some years and so would provide little insurance.
It is more realistic to suppose that bankruptcy is partly endogenous. A
borrower, for example, commonly has some control over whether he works
and how much he earns. If moral hazard exists, then consumer bankruptcy
policy issues raise the standard trade-off between risk and incentives. Be-
cause wage insurance in the United States is less than full, a risk-averse
borrower prefers as complete a discharge as the law can grant; but because
the extent of moral hazard varies inversely with the extent of insurance, a
surplus-maximizing borrower may prefer to realize the efficiency gain from
contracting for a limited discharge. As a consequence, both Chapter 7’s full
discharge and Chapter 13’s attempt to lien all of the borrower’s disposable
income reflect ‘‘corner solutions’’ that seldom are optimal.
Taking moral hazard into account also permits us to shed some light on
other reform proposals. Raising the exemption level exacerbates moral haz-
ard and thus worsens ex ante efficiency. Indeed, if a consumer has too few
assets to give up to creditors, he may be unable to borrow. This result may
explain recent empirical data that poor consumers have relatively more dif-
ficulty getting credit in states with higher exemptions.10 Consumer mort-
9 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our
Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America (1989).
10 See Gropp, Scholz, & White, supra note 2. These authors informally attribute credit
denials to low-income consumers to asymmetric information.
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gages could partly mitigate this inefficiency because they convert exempt
into nonexempt assets and so increase the creditors’ insolvency state payoff.
Consequently, efforts to restrict the ability of consumers to give security
and the Code’s prohibition of exemption waivers are questionable.11
Reaffirmations have an ambiguous efficiency effect. When an insolvent
borrower can trade future income for current assets, the creditor’s expected
insolvency state payoff increases, and this in a competitive credit market
will reduce the interest rate. This reduction in turn improves the borrower’s
incentive to avoid bankruptcy because the lower the interest rate, the larger
is the borrower’s share of the solvency state marginal return from effort,
and the more effort he will exert to maximize that return.12 If poor borrow-
ers have relatively little bargaining power, then reaffirmations will help the
poor the most.13 Such borrowers may have to share much ex post surplus
with their creditors, and this will have two desirable efficiency effects. The
consequent reduction in the interest rate will cause the borrower to work
harder to avoid insolvency for the reasons given; and because bankruptcy
remains tough on the borrower, renegotiation does not much reduce his
incentive to avoid it. Renegotiation for poor borrowers thus may often be
efficient and as a consequence will also be in the poor consumer’s ex
ante best interests (recall that borrowers capture the surplus from efficient
lending agreements). This implies that reaffirmations should be encour-
aged.14
11 Section 522(e) of the Bankruptcy Code makes exemption waivers unenforceable.
12 Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inef-
ficient Continuance, 15 J. L. Econ. & Org. 441 (1999), analyzes a similar trade-off in the
business context. See also Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 Cornell L.
Rev. 439, 475–76 (1992).
13 The term ‘‘poor’’ in text is less accurate than such descriptives as the ‘‘lower middle
class’’ or the ‘‘working poor’’: over 87 percent of Chapter 7 debtors and over 99 percent of
Chapter 13 debtors are employed. See Domowitz & Sartain, supra note 7. Our points regard-
ing reaffirmations also should not be overstated because a tough bankruptcy procedure may
provide less insurance than some consumers would want.
14 The NBRC was concerned that reaffirmations were inconsistent with the goal of treating
creditors equally. A creditor with low monitoring costs has the ability to exact a reaffirma-
tion, while other creditors will have their claims entirely discharged. This argument is unper-
suasive because the equality goal is misplaced in this context. An equality argument presup-
poses a metric: firms or persons may be said to be unequal along a particular dimension,
such as wealth. The NBRC did not set out a metric. To see why this failure is fatal, consider
the concern that some creditors are better placed or are better at collecting debts than others.
All creditors, however, had a chance to improve their collection opportunities and abilities.
Thus, there would be inequality of opportunity only if firms who are allowed to profit from
their commercial talents when extending credit initially should not be allowed to profit from
their commercial talents when collecting debts. The NBRC does not explain why the equality
goal should be so selectively pursued. The NBRC perhaps was striving for equality of result
among creditors, but this would have been a mistake because there already is equality of
result. The price for credit will reflect the creditor’s insolvency state payoff. Hence, creditors
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Finally, permitting debtors ex post to choose which bankruptcy chapter
to use seems questionable. Because parties can renegotiate in Chapter 7,
Chapter 13 cannot increase ex post surplus. Debtors, we show, choose the
chapter that minimizes the creditors’ insolvency state payoff. This worsens
ex ante efficiency because interest rates rise and bankruptcy is softer on
borrowers. Permitting debtors to choose between Chapters 7 and 13 thus
does not enhance ex post efficiency and reduces ex ante efficiency. On the
other hand, very risk averse borrowers may prefer ex ante to have the
choice because it increases the amount of insurance that the bankruptcy sys-
tem provides. Given heterogeneity among borrowers, this analysis suggests
permitting borrowers to waive their right in the lending agreement to
choose between chapters.
This last policy suggestion leads to a basic point of this article. Optimal
trade-offs between risk and incentives are context dependent; they depend
on the degree of a party’s risk aversion and her ability to affect the proba-
bility and magnitude of a bad outcome. Society commonly permits persons
to make the risk/incentive trade-off for themselves. As an example, the con-
sumer can choose the size of the deductible in most insurance policies. This
suggests that borrowers should have a similar freedom to choose the extent
of ‘‘bankruptcy insurance’’ they want to purchase. Bankruptcy contracting,
however, raises issues that are present in lesser degree in other contracting
contexts: that is, a bankruptcy contract may involve many parties, some of
whose interests may conflict; the contracts are intertemporal in scope; and
they may cause externalities. Because this article does not analyze these
contracting difficulties, its principal goal is to exhibit the efficiency gains
that could follow from a relaxation of the current prohibitions on consumer
bankruptcy contracting, and thus to make central the questions whether
such contracting would be normatively desirable, all things considered, and
technically feasible.
D. The Scope and Limits of the Analysis
Recent analyses of consumer bankruptcy have considered cognitive er-
ror—the borrower irrationally incurs too much debt—and political econ-
omy. Regarding the former, this paper restricts itself to the rational actor
paradigm. At this stage, it seems best to see what an efficient bankruptcy
system would look like on the assumption that all of the actors in it are
capable of maximizing expected utility. Later analyses should ask which
who are inefficient debt collectors will charge a higher price for credit than the good collec-
tors. But in a competitive credit market, all creditors earn zero profits: the pure profit from
efficient collection is competed away. Therefore, there now is equality of result.
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otherwise optimal rules would have to be modified if consumers make sys-
tematic cognitive errors.
We do not systematically explore the political causes of the current sys-
tem, again because it seems best to begin with substance. Our analysis is
related to politics, however. Political economy analyses have a normative
component. For example, a regulator is said to be captured if political pres-
sures caused her not to do what she should do. Thus, it is helpful to be able
to say what regulators should do about consumer bankruptcy. We go on
in the conclusion, however, to suggest that much of current law exists in
consequence of pressure from the bankruptcy bar and judges, who are the
system’s greatest concentrated beneficiary group.
Section II analyzes the consumer bankruptcy system on the assumption
that bankruptcy is exogenous. Section III relaxes this assumption to con-
sider moral hazard. Section IV is a conclusion that summarizes the norma-
tive implications of the analysis and suggests directions for future research.
II. Bankruptcy without Moral Hazard
A. A Simple Model
A risk-averse consumer borrows the sum D in period 0, promising to re-
pay R . D in period 1. The loan enables the borrower to get some nonpecu-
niary or illiquid benefit worth B to him. The borrower’s period 1 income is
subject to a random shock. With probability p he earns y . R, pays the
debt, and retains disposable income; with probability (1 2 p ) he earns zero
and is insolvent that period. The present value of his future income in pe-
riods after period 1 is Y, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be determi-
nate.15 For now, suppose that the consumer has no assets and cannot affect
the probability of period 1 insolvency.
In the absence of a bankruptcy law, a borrower who has a good realiza-
tion earns y, repays R, and then has wealth of B 1 y 2 R 1 Y. A borrower
who has a bad realization repays nothing in period 1 but—since he cannot
declare bankruptcy—must repay the debt out of future earnings. His wealth
in this circumstance is B 1 Y 2 R.
B. Insurance
A bankruptcy discharge provides the borrower with partial wage insur-
ance. In this model, a borrower’s expected wealth at the beginning of period
1 is B 1 Y 2 R 1 p y. A risk-averse borrower prefers to have this expected
15 We assume for convenience that the solvent debtor spends the remainder of his period
1 income after paying the debt.
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wealth in both possible future states with certainty. Failing that, he would
accept some reduction in his wealth in the good state in return for an in-
crease in his wealth in the bad state. Chapter 7 discharges the debtor when
he is insolvent. Thus, his insolvency state wealth is simply Y 1 B, the pres-
ent value of his future income as if the loan had never been made plus the
benefit the borrower received from the loan. Since the borrower would pay
nothing to creditors in the bad state, he must agree to pay them more in the
good state. In a competitive credit market, in which the creditors earn zero
profits, the sum the borrower agrees to repay, R, must equal the expected
value of the loan, D: D 5 p R 1 (1 2 p )0, so that R 5 D/ p . The borrower’s
good-state wealth thus becomes B 1 Y 1 y 2 D/ p . Since we assume that
y . R 5 D/ p , the borrower has greater wealth in the good state than in the
bad state, in which his wealth is only B 1 Y; hence, the bankruptcy dis-
charge does not fully insure the borrower against a shock to his wage in-
come.
This analysis has two normative implications. First, in this world of ex-
ogenous bankruptcy, consumer borrowers would not waive their right to a
bankruptcy discharge in return for a lower interest rate if the interest rate
difference only equaled the expected value of the creditor’s loss from de-
fault. A borrower would forgo ‘‘discharge insurance’’ only if he also was
paid a risk premium. Lenders would not pay risk premiums because the in-
terest rate is set by competition to equal the expected value of the sum the
borrower receives. Thus, a lender who also offered a risk premium would
incur losses. The issue whether consumers should be free to waive the right
to discharge therefore seems unimportant on the assumptions made so far.
Second, in this model, in which the borrower has no assets, needs-based
bankruptcy would plainly be suboptimal. Under that system, a debtor with
a relatively high future income would be required to repay as much of the
debt R as his circumstances permit. The borrower thus would have less in-
surance than he would be willing to purchase.
III. Moral Hazard
A. The Basic Analysis
In analyzing moral hazard, we add three assumptions to the model in
Section IIA:
Assumption A1. Borrowers now are risk neutral.
Assumption A2. The cause of bankruptcy is partly endogenous: that
is, borrowers can affect the probability of bankruptcy through their own ac-
tions.
Assumption A3. Creditors cannot observe either a borrower’s actions
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or their effect on the bankruptcy probability; that is, effort is noncontract-
ible.
Assumption A1 is made for convenience: we return to the more realistic
assumption that borrowers are risk averse below. Regarding assumption A2,
while medical debt is an important cause of bankruptcy, and is largely be-
yond a borrower’s control, increases in unsecured debt, especially credit
card debt, relative to income substantially increase the probability of bank-
ruptcy.16 Incurring debt, managing one’s financial affairs, and working hard
at a job are substantially within a borrower’s control. Formally, we capture
the existence of moral hazard by making the support of the outcome distri-
bution—the borrower earns either zero or y in period 1—be independent
of the borrower’s effort, but we allow effort to alter the distribution on the
fixed support. Assumption A3 is made because it seems true: were creditors
able to monitor borrowers perfectly, very different credit contracts would
be observed.
Turning to the analysis, p remains the probability of solvency but now
depends on the buyer’s efforts. Let y (p ) be the disutility cost of effort to a
borrower, and suppose that y (0) 5 0; y ¢ . 0; y † and y - . 0; and y (1)
5 ¥ . In brief, the borrower faces increasing marginal costs to reduce the
probability of insolvency, and he cannot reduce this probability to zero no
matter how hard he works. Recall from Section IIA that in a competitive
credit market, the borrower promises to repay R 5 D/ p . This is the credi-
tors’ zero profit participation constraint. The variables R and p are endoge-
nous: R is part of the loan contract, and the borrower chooses his effort
level, which partly determines p , after observing that contract.
Section IIA assumed that the loan generated a direct benefit of B to the
borrower; the loan did not affect the borrower’s future income Y, but now
the borrower’s period 1 income is affected indirectly by his efforts to avoid
insolvency. As a consequence, social welfare is the sum of the benefit from
the loan, the borrower’s future income, and his expected period 1 income,
less the cost of avoiding insolvency: W 5 B 1 Y 1 p y 2 y (p ). The (social)
first best would have the borrower set the marginal benefit of his efforts
equal to their marginal costs. This yields
y 5 y ¢ (p ). (1)
The borrower, however, has promised to repay his creditors out of his pe-
riod 1 income if he is solvent, and so he chooses p to maximize Wb 5 B
1 Y 1 p (y 2 R) 2 y (p ). The borrower’s first-order condition (which also
is sufficient in this case) thus sets
16 See Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy De-
cision, 54 J. Fin. 403 (1999).
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y 2 R 5 y ¢ (p ). (2)
Comparing the social first-order condition (1) to the borrower’s private
first-order condition (2), the left-hand side of condition (2) is less than the
left-hand side of condition (1), so the borrower will work less hard to avoid
insolvency than is socially optimal.
It may be illuminating to describe this result graphically.17 The hyperbola
in Figure 1 represents the creditor’s zero profit or participation constraint
and is written as R 5 D/ p . The concave downward-sloping curve represents
the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint, written as R 5 y 2 y ¢ (p ).
Both constraints can be satisfied only where the two curves cross; that is,
where y 2 y ¢ (p ) 5 D/ p . The social surplus is the area under the concave
curve.18 Hence, the first best would set p where the concave curve crosses
the axis, confirming the social first-order condition (1). The highest level of
effort (of p ) that satisfies both constraints, however, is the lower right cross-
ing of the two curves, the point p *, R*. The near-triangular shaded area
illustrates the deadweight loss.19
The inefficiency arises because the bankruptcy discharge makes the
difference in payoffs in the two possible future states smaller for the bor-
rower than it is for society. Put another way, the more ‘‘bankruptcy insur-
ance’’ the borrower has, the less is the difference between the borrower’s
solvency and insolvency state returns, and the less hard he will work to
avoid insolvency. Were there no bankruptcy discharge, the borrower would
have to repay the debt regardless of his period 1 return, thereby making
his private marginal incentive to exert effort equal to the social marginal
incentive.20
17 This and Figure 2 are similar to the figures in Sandeep Baliga & Benjamin Polak, Banks
versus Bonds: The Emergence and Persistence of Two Financial Systems (Discussion
Paper No. 1221, Northwestern Univ., Managerial Econ. & Decision Sci. Dep’t 1998).




[y 2 y ¢ (p )]d p .
19 We model a single credit extension. A common form of borrower moral hazard is to
run up credit card debt shortly before bankruptcy. This has the effect in our model of raising
the sum borrowed, D, thus tightening the creditors’ participation constraint D/ p and thereby
reducing the repayment probability p . See Figure 1. The Code attempts to restrict some forms
of ‘‘debt run up’’ by authorizing a bankruptcy court to dismiss a case for ‘‘substantial
abuse.’’ See U.S.C. § 707(b).
20 To see this formally, recall that without a bankruptcy discharge the buyer’s expected
wealth is Wbn 5 B 1 Y 1 p y 2 R 2 y (p ). The borrower maximizes his expected wealth in
this world by choosing p such that y 5 y ¢ (p ). This is equation (1), the condition for social
optimality.
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B. Realizable Assets
In this subsection, we retain the assumptions above but add that the bor-
rower has assets to give up to creditors in the insolvency state. Two good
effects follow from the debtor’s possession of assets. First, the borrower is
more motivated to avoid insolvency because he now has assets to protect.21
Second, the creditors will charge a lower interest rate (payable in the sol-
vency state) because they receive a higher return in the insolvency state.
Both effects induce the borrower to choose an effort level that is closer to
the social optimum than the level the borrower would choose had he no
assets to surrender.
To see how these effects increase ex ante efficiency, let a borrower have
assets of A that are below the value of his debt. Creditors earn R in the
solvency state, and, because the insolvency state return is zero, they earn A
when the borrower is bankrupt, where A , R. The zero-profit condition thus
becomes p R 1 (1 2 p )A 5 D. Just as before, the social first best is given
by the condition y 2 y ¢ (p ) 5 0. The borrower, however, now chooses p to
maximize Wb 5 B 1 Y 1 p (y 1 A 2 R) 2 y (p ). He thus will exert effort
such that
y 1 A 2 R 5 y ¢ (p ). (3)
The left-hand side of equation (3) is larger than the left-hand side of equa-
tion (2), which implies that the buyer will exert more effort to avoid insol-
vency.
We can illustrate the outcome with a graph similar to Figure 1. The hy-
perbola represents the creditor’s zero-profit or participation constraint, writ-
ten as R 2 A 5 (D 2 A)/ p . The concave downward-sloping curve repre-
sents the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint, written as R 2 A 5
y 2 y ¢ (p ). Once again, both constraints can be satisfied only where the
two curves cross: that is, where y 2 y ¢ (p ) 5 (D 2 A)/ p . We consider
four possible debtor asset levels, A1 . A2 . A3 . A4. As the debtor’s non-
exempt assets increase, say, from A2 to A1, the hyperbola representing
the zero-profit condition shifts down. The (relevant) intersection of the
two curves thus shifts down and to the right: the difference in the amount
the borrower promises to repay falls to (R1 2 A1) , (R2 2 A2), and the
probability of solvency increases to p 1 . p 2. As the buyer has more assets
to offer creditors when insolvent, efficiency is more closely approached
and the deadweight loss area under the curve is reduced. Recall that when
21 Domowitz & Sartain, supra note 16, found that home ownership discourages bankruptcy
but did not attempt to relate the possession of other assets to the insolvency probability.
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Figure 1.—The optimal debt contract without realizable assets
credit markets are competitive, the borrower captures the entire expected
gain.22
From a policy point of view, raising bankruptcy exemptions reduces the
level of available assets and thus reduces efficiency. If exemptions become
too high, some borrowers may be unable to obtain credit because there will
be no contract that will satisfy both the lender’s participation constraint and
the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint. To illustrate this, observe
that the asset level A3 in Figure 2 (for which the constraint curves are just
tangent) is the lowest asset level at which the borrower could obtain the
loan D. The loan contract corresponding to asset level A3 produces positive
surplus: in addition to the direct benefit of the loan, B, the surplus generated
by borrower efforts (the area under the concave curve) still exceeds the cost
of the loan. The curve describing asset level A4 characterizes a borrower
with too few assets to sustain a loan of D. Since a loan at the tangency point
22 Another way to phrase the result is to observe that the presence of assets essentially
reduces the size of the loan over which the borrower exercises discretion. This reduces the
magnitude of moral hazard. The creditors’ participation constraint can be written as R 5 A
1 (D 2 A)/ p . As A approaches D, the second term on the right-hand side approaches zero:
the influence of p , and thus of borrower effort, on the terms of the lending agreement be-
comes negligible.
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Figure 2.—Realizable assets and efficiency
still made strictly positive surplus, so also would some of the excluded loan
contracts.23 The inefficiency cost of high exemption levels likely is hardest
on relatively poor consumers. Many relatively poor persons have acquired
some assets, but these borrowers are more likely than middle-class borrow-
ers to have erratic income prospects.24
The results in Sections IIIA and IIIB can be summarized in the following:
Proposition 1:
a) If borrowers are risk neutral, a bankruptcy discharge is ex ante ineffi-
cient because it reduces to below the socially optimal level the borrower’s
effort to avoid bankruptcy.
23 It has been shown (with a different model) that when there can be moral hazard, a firm that
has few assets to offer to creditors in the insolvency state may be unable to borrow. See Alan
Schwartz, The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm’s Investment Policy, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 1213
(1994). This regrettable result can be produced by the law, when it reduces the assets that creditors
can take after insolvency. There is some indirect evidence to support the result that the exemption
level affects borrower incentives. Ronel Elul & Narayanan Subramanian, Forum-Shopping and
Personal Bankruptcy (Working Paper No. 99-1, Brown Univ., Dep’t Econ. 1999), shows that
borrowers sometimes move from low to high exemption states when bankruptcy is contemplated.
If borrowers will do this, they likely also will exert effort initially to preserve assets.
24 Under current exemption levels, 95 percent of Chapter 7 bankruptcies are no-asset cases.
This suggests that raising these levels still further would injure both consumer borrowers and
society.
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b) The inefficiency attributable to discharge is mitigated when the bor-
rower has assets to give up to his creditors in the insolvency state.
c) Exemption laws remove assets from the bankrupt estate and thereby
restore some of the ex ante inefficiency.
Remark 1. Proposition 1a25 implies that the bankruptcy discharge
should be eliminated because the first best occurs when borrowers bear the
entire insolvency risk. To eliminate discharge would not be optimal, how-
ever, because most borrowers are risk averse. Thus, a socially efficient con-
sumer bankruptcy law would reflect a trade-off between risk and incentives.
It is difficult to devise such a law, though, because risk aversion differs
across individuals and is hard for the decision maker to observe. Thus,
proposition 1 should be read only to tell decision makers not to neglect
moral hazard considerations when choosing a bankruptcy system. Parts b
and c of the proposition are in this spirit.
Remark 2. Proposition 1a also suggests that decision makers should
seriously consider relaxing the current prohibition on contracting about
bankruptcy. To the extent that the purpose of the bankruptcy discharge is
to provide persons with partial wage insurance, a borrower should be per-
mitted to choose how much insurance he wants to buy. A highly risk averse
borrower would choose the full Chapter 7 discharge. A less risk averse bor-
rower, or a borrower with considerable control over his future affairs,
would buy less insurance—agreeing ex ante to repay a fraction of his debt
if bankruptcy occurs. Such a contract would relax the creditor’s participa-
tion constraint and thus increase the borrower’s (and society’s) expected
surplus. Also, a borrower could condition a waiver of discharge on the non-
occurence of exogenous, verifiable events such as the failure of the borrow-
er’s employer or a sudden, serious illness. In a world of free contracting,
discharge thus would be partial or conditional for many borrowers, the ex-
tent of these alterations depending on a borrower’s preferences and circum-
stances.
We do not recommend free contracting in this article for technical and
substantive reasons, however. Regarding the technical reasons, when a con-
sumer borrower deals with several creditors, he may agree to inconsistent
‘‘bankruptcy terms.’’ For example, an unsophisticated consumer could
agree to one set of bankruptcy procedures with creditor A and a different
25 Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle J. White, An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and
Proposed Reforms (unpublished manuscript, Univ. Michigan, Dep’t Econ. 1999), obtains a
result similar to proposition 1a in a model in which moral hazard does not arise in connection
with avoiding insolvency but rather from the penchant of insolvent debtors to engage in stra-
tegic behavior ex post: the debtors rearrange their assets to minimize the creditors’ bank-
ruptcy payoff. We consider the effect of this behavior below in our discussion of the debtor’s
choice of bankruptcy chapter.
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set with creditor B. Thus, some coordination mechanism may be necessary
in consumer markets.26 Also, it may be very costly to specify all relevant
contingencies in a contract. Finally, we assume that creditors know bor-
rower failure probabilities (in equilibrium) and the distribution of risk aver-
sion in the relevant population. If these assumptions are relaxed, efficient
contracts would be more difficult to make.
Regarding the substantive reasons, the bankruptcy discharge is said to
serve three goals. The first, as said, is to provide persons with partial wage
insurance. The second is to internalize possible externalities associated with
the extension of credit. A consumer who has a bad income realization and
who lacks insurance may become a ward of the state. Also, a person whose
income is liened will work less hard, and part of the cost may be external-
ized to an employer or the tax collector. Persons do not take these possible
costs into account when borrowing money.27 The third goal of the bank-
ruptcy discharge is to prevent ‘‘wage slavery’’: without a discharge, a
debtor could be working partly for her creditors for a long time. Some ob-
servers may find the latter two goals sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the virtues of freedom of contract. This article does not seriously analyze
these technical and substantive concerns with consumer bankruptcy con-
tracting. Rather, its goal is to exhibit the virtues that such contracting may
yield and, thus, to move contracting issues from the periphery of consumer
bankruptcy study to its center.
Remark 3. Propositions 1b and 1c suggest that borrowers should be
permitted to make partial or full exemption waivers. Unlike a waiver of the
bankruptcy discharge itself, an exemption waiver is not substantively objec-
tionable. An exemption waiver reduces the amount of insurance the bor-
rower has but increases the amount of surplus the deal yields him. Subject
to the technical concerns noted above, the borrower should be permitted to
make this trade-off for himself. An exemption waiver also does not impair
the borrower’s postbankruptcy earning capacity, thereby implying that she
will not become a ward of the state or a wage slave.28
An implicit assumption here is that the debtor’s assets do not generate
26 This difficulty would not apply to simple waivers of the right to discharge particular
debts; these are analytically equivalent to giving security.
27 The externality justification for discharge should not be overstated because the increase
in interest rates that discharge causes may prevent a borrower from making investments that
also generate positive externalities. For example, high interest rates may dampen demand for
credit used to finance the borrower’s education, and this may justify the current nondis-
chargeability of government-subsidized student loans.
28 A debtor today can effectively waive an exemption in certain property by giving a secu-
rity interest in it. There may be a lack of coherence in a statute that prohibits discharge and
exemption waivers but permits consumers to realize some of the effects of these waivers by
giving security.
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income. Formally, the debtor’s future income, Y, is unaffected by the value
or character of the assets creditors can reach. This assumption sometimes
is unrealistic. For example, consider a sole proprietor of a machine shop
who files an individual bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. If creditors can
take all of her machines, her future earning power may be seriously im-
paired. The assumption of non-income-generating assets, however, covers
a lot of cases: most consumer borrowers generate income only with their
human capital. To the extent that this is false, our recommendations regard-
ing exemptions should be modified.
C. Renegotiation
Many debtors reaffirm part or all of a debt after filing a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy. A large number of these reaffirmations are with secured creditors
and involve trading future income for the right to retain current nonexempt
assets. Reaffirmations are heavily regulated today, and the NBRC in effect
recommended that they be prohibited. Debtors are said often to make fool-
ish reaffirmation bargains, in which they give up too much for what they
get.
Reaffirmations (called here ‘‘renegotiations’’) have three effects. To un-
derstand these, realize that a typical asset has two values, its value to the
debtor (AD) and its value to the market (AM). A creditor who repossesses,
or who gets the value of the debtor’s assets after discharge, realizes AM. We
assume that R . AD $ AM (assets are worth less than the debt and generate
surplus for their owners), so debtors always want to renegotiate.29 The first
effect of reaffirmations is that they increase ex post surplus; that is, society
realizes AD rather than AM.
The other two consequences of reaffirmations affect ex ante efficiency
and depend on the ex post bargaining power of the borrower and his credi-
tors.30 Let b ˛ [0, 1] index the debtor’s bargaining power, where b 5 1
means that the entire ex post surplus from renegotiation (AD 2 AM) accrues
to the debtor. In the usual case, bargaining power is shared. The debtor
keeps his nonexempt assets and make a payment to the creditor (out of fu-
ture income) of AM 1 (1 2 b )(AD 2 AM). Competitive credit markets, antic-
ipating this greater payment in the insolvency state, will force lenders to
reduce the interest rate.31 When the interest rate falls, the borrower keeps
29 If an exempt asset is worth more to the market than to the debtor, the debtor can sell
the asset to his creditors. Such sales are not controversial because the debtor does not lien
his future income.
30 Our assumption that credit markets are competitive ex ante does not imply that creditors
have no ex post bargaining power.
31 This would here entail reducing the amount the borrower promises to repay: that is,
lowering R.
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more of the marginal solvency state return and so will exert more effort to
avoid bankruptcy. This second effect of reaffirmations is ex ante efficient.
On the other hand, the debtor’s share of the ex post surplus from renegotia-
tion, b (AD 2 AM), reduces the harshness of insolvency for the debtor (who
previously lost the entire value of his nonexempt assets). This third effect
reduces the incentive of a borrower to avoid bankruptcy and so is ex ante
inefficient.
While it seems impossible to sign the effect of renegotiation in general,
we can identify the parameters on which the sign depends.
Proposition 2. Renegotiation is ex ante efficient when p # (1 2 b ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Regarding the intuition, a reaffirmation has two positive efficiency ef-
fects. First, it generates an ex post surplus in the insolvency state (this is
AD 2 AM). Second, if the creditor expects to share in this surplus, interest
rates in the solvency state will fall and the buyer’s incentive to provide ef-
fort will increase. When the borrower will succeed with a relatively low
probability ( p is small), the second effect will be significant: if failure is a
realistic prospect, the expected value of the insolvency state surplus is rela-
tively large, and this will lower the interest rate and thereby increase the
borrower’s incentive to avoid bankruptcy. The third effect of reaffirmations
is negative: renegotiation lowers the borrower’s incentive to avoid bank-
ruptcy because the borrower realizes part of the ex post surplus, but this
effect is slight when the borrower has little ex post bargaining power ( b is
small). The creditor then keeps a large share of the surplus (which lowers
the interest rate) and the borrower has a strong incentive to avoid bank-
ruptcy because he does badly in it despite the opportunity to renegotiate.
Proposition 2 thus holds that renegotiation is ex ante efficient when both p
and b are small. The proposition, however, considers only how the success
probability and the parties’ ex post bargaining power can alter the ex ante
efficiency effects that renegotiation produces. Consequently, the proposition
is not an if and only if result: a renegotiation that failed to satisfy the propo-
sition’s inequality could be efficient all in all if it produced enough ex post
surplus—the first effect. A renegotiation that does satisfy the inequality
necessarily is efficient, though, because the surplus-generating effect of re-
negotiation always is positive and the latter two p and b effects would then
be positive on net.32
Remark 4. Proposition 2 suggests that renegotiation may help rela-
tively poor borrowers, the group the NBRC was most concerned about.
These borrowers may have less stable jobs or be less able to withstand
32 This analysis does not require renegotiation to be 100 percent ex post efficient. The proof
of proposition 2 considers only renegotiations that recover ex post surplus at the margin.
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shocks to their wage income; hence, they are the group most likely to de-
fault. Also, relatively poor borrowers may have little bargaining experience
and are less likely to be represented by lawyers. When p and b both are
low, renegotiation maximizes expected social surplus, and the borrowers
will capture all of this gain in the form of better ex ante credit.33
Remark 5. Proposition 2 illustrates an additional way for bankruptcy
contracting to increase efficiency. Consider three possible legal rules.
(a) Reaffirmations are banned altogether. The ban could be efficient only
when p and b are high, but perhaps not even then because the ban wipes out
the insolvency state surplus. (b) Reaffirmations are permitted but ex ante
bankruptcy contracts are banned. Permitting renegotiation restores the sur-
plus but can yield inefficiency when p and b are high. (c) Both reaffirma-
tions and partial bankruptcy waivers are permitted. Under this rule, a bor-
rower for whom p and b are high could agree to pay to the creditor the
borrower’s share of the expected renegotiation surplus b (AD 2 AM) out of
her postbankruptcy income Y. The creditor thus would recover its share of
the surplus (1 2 b )(AD 2 AM) in the renegotiation plus this payment, ensur-
ing to the creditor all of AD 2 AM in the insolvency state. As a consequence,
the waiver would increase the borrower’s solvency state return above her
return were waivers banned because competition would induce the creditor
to reduce the interest rate below the nonwaiver rate. The borrower would
benefit from the ex ante efficiency effect of this lower rate. Under the
waiver, the insolvent borrower would retain surplus because she keeps the
asset, but she must pay to the creditor the share of the ex post surplus that
the creditor’s bargaining power can command in the renegotiation and the
remainder later, thus realizing an insolvency state return of Y 1 B 1 (AD
2 AM) 2 b (AD 2 AM) 2 (1 2 b )(AD 2 AM) 5 Y 1 B. This is all the wage
insurance that the bankruptcy system can provide. Therefore, this partial
waiver permits the borrower to realize some of the efficiencies of bank-
ruptcy contracting without sacrificing insurance coverage. Rule c, which
combines reaffirmations and ex ante waivers, thus is preferable to rule a,
which bans reaffirmations, or rule b, which bans waivers.34
These results rest importantly on the assumption that credit markets are
competitive. When this assumption is relaxed, then the case the NBRC
33 Many borrowers reaffirm unsecured debts, apparently to increase their ability to get
credit (a reaffirmation is a good signal of future willingness to repay). These reaffirmations
have good ex ante incentive effects. Creditors who anticipate getting reaffirmations will re-
duce the interest rate, yet because bankruptcy would remain hard on the borrower, he will
not exert less effort to avoid it.
34 Remarks 2 and 3 regarding the technical difficulties with consumer bankruptcy con-
tracting and the substantive permissibility of waivers also apply here and to remark 6 infra.
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imagined exists: renegotiation disadvantages borrowers with little bar-
gaining power (a low b ). Formally, we have the following:
Proposition 3. If the creditor has a monopoly at the lending stage but
the borrower retains some of the (ex ante) surplus that the equilibrium lend-
ing agreement creates, then renegotiation is advantageous to the borrower
when b . 1/2. As b approaches zero, renegotiation harms the borrower.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We first set out the intuition and then argue that the result should not
influence bankruptcy policy. To begin, retain all of the assumptions made
above except let the creditor have a monopoly at the lending stage and then
assume that reaffirmations are banned. The creditor could raise R (and thus
the interest rate) to the monopoly level, but the success probability p falls
when R increases. The creditor in this legal world earns R when the bor-
rower succeeds and AM, the market value of the borrower’s nonexempt
assets, when the borrower fails. Thus, the cost to the creditor of raising R
is the marginal decrease in p times the creditor’s marginal gain from suc-
cess (R 2 AM). Because this cost is positive, the creditor has a strong incen-
tive not to raise R to the monopoly level, thereby leaving the borrower with
some ex ante surplus. Put concisely, moral hazard will here constrain mo-
nopoly pricing.35
Now assume that renegotiation is permissible and consider the extreme
case where the borrower has no bargaining power ( b 5 0). Unlike a similar
borrower when the credit market is competitive, this borrower is made
worse off by renegotiation. Neither borrower will realize ex post surplus,
but in the monopoly case the interest rate rises when the borrower lacks ex
post bargaining power, while in the competitive case the interest rate de-
clines. To understand why the rate increases in the monopoly case, recall
that when the borrower has no ex post bargaining power and renegotiation
is permitted, the creditor captures all of the ex post surplus and so its insol-
vency state payoff rises to AD. As a consequence, the marginal cost of in-
creasing R becomes the marginal decrease in p times (R 2 AD). This is a
smaller cost than when renegotiation is banned, because AD . AM, so the
creditor will raise R. Therefore, when the creditor has market power ex ante
and bargaining power ex post, the borrower, who likely is a relatively poor
person, not only realizes little ex post surplus but also faces a higher interest
rate.36
35 When the creditor has market power, two cases can arise. In the more common one just
described, the borrower’s participation constraint is slack; the buyer retains ex ante surplus.
It can happen, though, that this constraint will bind.
36 Similar analysis of a monopoly lender’s market reveals that a borrower with nonexempt
assets faces a higher interest rate than an otherwise identical borrower with no such asset.
Any nonexempt asset, like the lender’s share of surplus from an asset subject to reaffirmation,
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 12:37:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 605
Now consider the second extreme case, in which the borrower has all of
the ex post bargaining power ( b 5 1). The interest rate will fall for this
borrower relative to the borrower with little bargaining power, for two rea-
sons. First, the marginal cost to the creditor of raising the interest rate is
restored to the marginal decrease in p times (R 2 AM) because the creditor
now realizes no ex post surplus. Regarding the second reason, the borrower
now has a smaller incentive to avoid bankruptcy because bankruptcy is less
harsh on him and so p falls. When the probability that the creditor will be
repaid declines, the marginal benefit of increasing the interest rate R also
declines. Therefore, a borrower with considerable ex post bargaining power
both keeps more of the ex post surplus and pays a lower interest rate. Prop-
osition 3 characterizes these results precisely, stating that a sufficient condi-
tion for renegotiation to become beneficial to the borrower is that he have
more than half the ex post bargaining power.
Proposition 3 should not count in favor of banning or restricting reaffir-
mations, however. As a matter of fact, credit markets appear competitive,
so the proposition likely describes few real-world cases. Furthermore, mo-
nopoly power in credit markets often is a consequence of regulation. Hence,
often a good response to it is to reduce barriers to entry. Apart from this,
it is better to attack market power directly with the antitrust laws than at-
tempt to ameliorate one of its many effects by regulating reaffirmations.
D. Renegotiation and the Debtor’s Choice of Bankruptcy Chapter
That debtors can renegotiate in Chapter 7 also implies that there is an
efficiency cost to permitting an insolvent debtor to choose which bank-
ruptcy chapter to use. Renegotiation in Chapter 7 permits the parties to real-
ize AD 2 AM, the difference between the value of an asset to the debtor and
to the market. Chapter 13 may redistribute this surplus—by permitting the
borrower to pay the creditor less than in a Chapter 7 renegotiation—but
cannot increase it. It remains to show that the availability of Chapter 13
worsens ex ante efficiency. Begin with the debtor’s choice between chap-
ters. A Chapter 13 debtor can keep all of his assets but must pay over all
of his disposable income to his creditors. The debtor will ignore exempt
assets when choosing between these chapters because both permit him to
keep them.
Turning to nonexempt assets, let the bankruptcy court permit a Chapter
increases the lender’s insolvency state payoff and thus implies a higher R. This observation,
however, is of little consequence for bankruptcy policy, as there is of course no proposal that
borrowers generally be deprived of their nonexempt assets!
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13 debtor to keep F of his postbankruptcy income Y, where 0 , F , 1.37
The price of keeping an exempt asset in Chapter 13 thus is (1 2 F )Y, the
sum in present value terms that creditors get. The debtor will compare the
prices for keeping the asset that the two chapters set. Chapter 13 is prefera-
ble when (1 2 F )Y , [AM 1 (1 2 b )(AD 2 AM)]. The term in brackets on
the right-hand side is the Chapter 7 renegotiation payment the debtor makes
to the creditor in order to keep the asset. This expression simplifies to (1 2
F )Y , AD 1 b (AD 2 AM). Hence, debtors prefer Chapter 13 when they can
keep a large share of their postbankruptcy income ( F is big), when they
have a high valuation for the asset (AD is big), when they have little bar-
gaining power in Chapter 7 ( b is small), and when there is little surplus
over which to renegotiate (AD 2 AM is small).38
More significant, the parties’ preferences conflict. To see how, let AD
2 AM 5 x so the debtor prefers to use Chapter 13 when (a) (1 2 F )Y ,
AD 2 b x. The creditors prefer the debtor to use Chapter 13 when the Chap-
ter 13 payment to them is larger than the share of the renegotiation surplus
they can extract in Chapter 7, that is, when (b) (1 2 F )Y . AD 2 b x.
Intuitively, the debtor will choose the chapter that minimizes the price for
keeping the asset, while the creditors would prefer him to choose the chap-
ter that maximizes the price. Hence, when the debtor files for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7, his creditors would have preferred him to file under Chap-
ter 13.
Turning to ex ante efficiency, because debtors use Chapter 13 when they
do better under it than they would do in a Chapter 7 renegotiation, the avail-
ability of Chapter 13 makes bankruptcy less harsh on borrowers in expecta-
tion and they will work less hard to avoid it. Also, because Chapter 13 per-
mits debtors to minimize the creditors’ ex post payment, its existence
causes creditors to raise the interest rate. This further worsens the borrow-
er’s incentives because the borrower can keep less of the marginal solvency
state return and so will exert less effort to maximize that return.
Another way to explain this result is to refer to proposition 2, which
37 The bankruptcy court should set F to eliminate the borrower’s disposable income. Thus,
F is a function of the borrower’s post-bankruptcy income Y. We assume that bankruptcy has
no effect on Y, and this implies that F is exogenous. A debtor can redeem a nonexempt asset
in Chapter 7 by paying the debt in a lump sum, while he can keep the asset and make install-
ment payments in Chapter 13. This difference in the mode of payment is said to bias debtors
to choose Chapter 13, but a Chapter 7 reaffirmation can involve paying the debt plus a frac-
tion of the ex post surplus in installments. Thus, we do not consider payment modes when
discussing the debtor’s choice between the two chapters.
38 Domowitz & Sartain, supra note 7, and Domowitz & Sartain, supra note 16, find that
borrowers are more likely to choose Chapter 7 when the exemption level is high. This is
consistent with the analysis here: a high exemption level implies that a borrower is less likely
to have nonexempt assets that are worth a lot to him (that is, AD is small).
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showed that renegotiation increases ex ante efficiency when p , 1 2 b .
The availability of Chapter 13 increases the debtor’s bargaining power (in-
creases b ) because creditors may have to bribe the borrower to use Chapter
7. When the debtor has more bargaining power ex post, the inequality is
harder to satisfy and renegotiation is less likely to be ex ante efficient. This
analysis can be summarized in the following.
Proposition 4. There is an efficiency cost to permitting borrowers to
choose between Chapters 7 and 13 because Chapter 13 cannot increase ex
post efficiency and giving debtors the option worsens ex ante efficiency.
Remark 6. A highly risk averse borrower might prefer ex ante to retain
the choice of filing under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 because this maximizes
the borrower’s insolvency state payoff and thus gives him more insurance.
Proposition 4 thus does not support repeal of Chapter 13, but it does suggest
that borrowers should be allowed to waive their right to use either Chapter
7 or Chapter 13 (making the nonwaived section operative). A borrower
would offer a waiver when the improvement in his ex ante terms of trade
would exceed the expected value of any increased ex post benefit from hav-
ing a choice of chapters. Such contracts would increase efficiency but are
unenforceable today.
Remark 7. Requiring high-income debtors to use Chapter 13, as with
needs-based bankruptcy, could improve ex ante efficiency in two ways.
First, if borrowers are risk neutral, then proposition 1a showed that they
would reject bankruptcy insurance. Chapter 13 requires debtors to pay over
all of their disposable income to creditors and thus leaves borrowers largely
uninsured. Second, debtors have less bargaining power in Chapter 13 than
in Chapter 7 because the Chapter 13 creditor has a more powerful threat
point if the parties cannot agree. Proposition 2 showed that ex ante effi-
ciency increases (in the competitive case) when the debtor’s bargaining
power declines. Many borrowers, however, are risk averse. As to these bor-
rowers, the law must harmonize the conflicting goals of insuring borrowers
and providing them with appropriate incentives. A mandatory Chapter 13
would not be optimal in this world because bankruptcy would then provide
less insurance than almost any borrower would want. Therefore, the alterna-
tives of permitting free contracting or reducing a borrower’s bargaining
power in Chapter 7 should be considered and rejected before advocating a
mandatory Chapter 13.
E. Renegotiation and the Debtor’s Human Capital
The fresh-start policy embodied in Chapter 7 permits a debtor to emerge
from bankruptcy with his human capital intact. Remark 2 above noted that
for some the discharge is substantively desirable because liens on a per-
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son’s income may cause externalities or be thought a form of wage slavery.
A very strong commitment to the fresh-start policy thus would also imply
prohibiting reaffirmations, which lien the borrower’s future income. That
strong a commitment to the policy is hard to justify, however.
A debtor who renegotiates in Chapter 7 is restoring part or all of a debt.
If society permits person to incur debts, it apparently also should permit
reaffirmations. Also, society today permits a debtor to lien a large portion
of his future income in Chapter 13. If a lien is permissible under one bank-
ruptcy chapter, it is difficult to see why the same or a smaller lien should
be impermissible under the other.
To be sure, the debtor has failed once and so may be thought to be less
trustworthy. This seems a weak ground on which to ban reaffirmations.39
Bankruptcy seldom is a happy experience, so a debtor is likely to be more
careful when bargaining while insolvent than he was when incurring the
original debt. Also, creditors who agree to reaffirmations are trading the
right to receive an asset today for a claim on the debtor’s future income.
The creditors’ desire to be repaid suggests that market discipline will help
to prevent reaffirmation bargains that debtors are unlikely to keep. These
arguments suggest that while a desire to protect a person’s human capital
implies that there should be a bankruptcy discharge, that desire does not
also imply the prohibition of efficient partial waivers.
IV. Conclusion
This paper attempts to contribute to the small literature that treats con-
sumer bankruptcy theoretically. It argues that a consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem should have two ex ante goals: to insure consumers, to the extent possi-
ble, against bad income realizations and to reduce moral hazard in
connection with lending agreements. These two objectives are in tension
because the borrower’s incentive to avoid bankruptcy is decreasing in the
extent to which bankruptcy insures him. As an example, permitting the bor-
rower to offer his creditors assets as well as income in the insolvency state
will increase ex ante efficiency. When creditors can reach assets, their insol-
vency state payoffs increase, thereby inducing a fall in the interest rate. This
improves the borrower’s incentive to stay solvent; he can keep more of the
marginal solvency state return. Also, when the borrower has assets to pro-
39 Some reformers who oppose reaffirmations on the ground that sophisticated creditors
will exploit unsophisticated borrowers who mistakenly took on too much debt also claim that
insolvency is exogenous. These positions are in tension because an inference that a person
is commercially incompetent cannot rest on a bankruptcy caused by an exogenous event.
Hence, if consumers can be trusted to borrow initially, they apparently should be trusted to
reaffirm.
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tect, he will work harder to avoid bankruptcy. Consequently, raising the
personal exemption level would reduce ex ante efficiency. On the other
hand, lowering the exemption level reduces the amount of wage insurance
that the bankruptcy system provides.
The tension between risk and incentives is partly mitigated by renegotia-
tion; reaffirmations permit borrowers to increase the creditors’ payoff in the
insolvency state, and this can improve the borrower’s incentive to exert ef-
fort to stay solvent. The desirable effects of reaffirmations are more likely
to benefit relatively less well-off consumers. This suggests that current re-
strictions on reaffirmations should be relaxed and proposals to limit reaf-
firmations still further are unwise.
An ex post efficient bankruptcy system would permit debtors to trade
claims on their future income for the right to retain nonexempt assets and,
also, will not excessively lien a debtor’s human capital. Debtors can make
the requisite trades in Chapter 7 renegotiations. Hence, Chapter 13 cannot
increase ex post surplus, and, we show, offering debtors the option to
choose a bankruptcy chapter worsens ex ante efficiency because it makes
bankruptcy too soft on debtors and lowers the creditors’ expected insol-
vency state payoff. On the other hand, the ability to choose between chap-
ters increases the borrower’s ex post payoff and thus provides a little more
insurance for very risk averse debtors. Reform proposals to make Chapter
13 mandatory seem ill advised because that would eliminate much of bank-
ruptcy’s insurance function. Rather, we argue that consideration be given
to permitting consumer borrowers to waive their right to choose between
chapters in the lending agreement. Many consumers likely would prefer the
better terms of trade that waiver would yield to the extra insurance that a
choice of chapter provides.
Perhaps of greatest importance, serious consideration should be given to
permitting consumers to contract about bankruptcy. In a world where the
cause of bankruptcy is exogenous (there is no moral hazard), consumers
would reject contracts that reduced current bankruptcy protections because
consumers prefer full insurance. In the world in which we live, a borrower
commonly has some control over his fate. Society permits persons to trade
off risk and incentives in most of the commercial contexts in which they
function. Relevant here, creditors could offer borrowers lending agreements
that will induce constrained efficient trade-offs between insurance and in-
centives, and the borrowing side will get the benefit of this efficiency. We
have not carefully analyzed the technical and substantive concerns that con-
sumer bankruptcy contracting raise, however, so our proposals to increase
free contracting should be regarded more as an agenda for research than as
the advocacy of legal change.
This paper evaluates bankruptcy law with the efficiency norm because
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reforms that increase ex ante efficiency also benefit consumer borrowers,
who realize the entire ex ante social surplus from lending agreements in
competitive credit markets. Reaffirmations also help consumer borrowers
by letting them keep a share of the surplus that asset ownership generates.
Nevertheless, a harsh bankruptcy law is harsh, and we now have only two
things to say about this. First, even under the reforms we tentatively advo-
cate, borrowers would emerge from bankruptcy with their human capital
intact, except where they lien portions of it to keep assets that are particu-
larly valuable to them. Thus, we would preserve much of bankruptcy’s in-
surance function. Second, while efficiency should be tempered with com-
passion, the issue is how to realize this trade-off in the form of
administrable bankruptcy rules. No one, including us, has made much prog-
ress with this question.40
Reformers such as the NBRC claim that a good consumer bankruptcy
system would ensure equality of result among creditors, reduce strategic be-
havior by debtors, and increase uniformity in administering the law. The
pursuit of equality among creditors makes little sense in the bankruptcy
context for two reasons. (a) In the zero-profit equilibria that commonly ob-
tain in credit markets, no creditor does very much better than the others.41
(b) Pursuing equality among creditors disadvantages debtors, especially the
least well off of them, by severely restricting reaffirmations and also by re-
ducing the creditors’ incentive to develop more efficient collection mecha-
nisms. The other two reformer goals would be largely achieved by the legal
changes suggested here. As an example, two of the most common forms of
strategic behavior are converting nonexempt assets into exempt assets on
the eve of bankruptcy and using Chapter 13 strategically to stay foreclosure
when the debtor has no serious hope of complying with a repayment plan.
Debtors would gain less from rearranging their assets were the exemption
level reduced and were they more able to give security in their property.
The second form of strategic behavior would be ameliorated were borrow-
ers permitted to waive their right to use Chapter 13. Similarly, much of the
nonuniformity in current administration is in Chapter 13, and this too would
diminish if the chapter were used less frequently.
40 In the business context, there is an efficiency trade-off between soft and hard bankruptcy
procedures. A hard procedure has desirable ex ante incentive effects, but insolvent firms are
reluctant to use it. When creditors can observe insolvency only with a lag, the firm thus may
keep payments current while it dissipates assets. This is ex post inefficient. See Paul Povel,
Optimal ‘‘Soft’’ or ‘‘Tough’’ Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J. L. Econ. & Org. 659 (1999). We
do not model this trade-off here. Many insolvent consumers lack the cash to stall creditors
for very long while they dissipate assets, and, as shown, they often prefer to keep their assets
intact.
41 See note 14 supra.
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Regrettably, the reforms urged here will have a hard time in Congress.
Current business and consumer bankruptcy law ban free contracting over
bankruptcy and force insolvents into the system. The system also creates
incentives for parties to use its most costly parts—Chapter 11 for business
bankruptcy and Chapter 13 for consumer bankruptcy. Reform proposals,
such as needs-based bankruptcy, would increase the use of Chapter 13. In
addition, current law requires many fact-specific inquiries. For example,
courts are supposed to find whether a reaffirmation is in a debtor’s best
interests. The current business and consumer bankruptcy systems thus
substantially benefit the bankruptcy bar, the bankruptcy judges, and the
academics whose consulting income increases with the cost, complexity,
and court centeredness of the system. These groups have dominated the cur-
rent reform debate and past debates as well. Informal speculation plausibly
suggests that we have the consumer bankruptcy system that the lawyers
want.42
APPENDIX A
Appendix A proves proposition 2. To begin, let a ˛ (0, 1) index the effectiveness
of renegotiation, where a 5 0 implies no renegotiation and a 5 1 implies renegoti-
ation. Also, let AD 2 AM 5 x, the renegotiation surplus. The social surplus from a
lending agreement is SS 5 B 1 p (y 1 AD) 1 (1 2 p )(AM 1 a x) 2 y (p ). The
marginal social surplus then is MSS 5 d(SS)/dp 5 y 1 (1 2 a )x 2 y ¢ (p ). The credi-
tors’ participation constraint—the zero-profit condition—is D 5 p R 1 (1 2 p )[AM
1 a (1 2 b )(x)]. It will later be convenient to have this condition rewritten as
R 2 [AM 1 a (1 2 b )(x)] 5 D 2 [A
M 1 a (1 2 b )(x)]
p
. (A1)
Given the lending agreement, the borrower chooses p to maximize p (y 1 AD 2 R)
1 (1 2 p )ab (x) 2 y (p ). The first-order condition for a private optimum thus is y
1 AD 2 ab (x) 2 y ¢ (p ) 5 R. This can be rewritten as
y 1 (1 2 a )(x) 2 y ¢ (p ) 5 R 2 AM 2 a (1 2 b )(x). (A2)
The left-hand side of equation (A2) is the marginal social surplus, and the right-
hand side is the left-hand side of the zero-profit condition in equation (A1). Com-
bining equations (A1) and (A2) yields an implicit definition of p (a ), which tells
how renegotiation affects the failure probability:
y 1 (1 2 a )(x) 2 y ¢ (p ) 5 D 2 [A
M 1 a (1 2 b )(x)]
p
. (A3)
42 For similar views, see Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (1997); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the
Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 497 (1998), which concludes (at
521), ‘‘[B]ankruptcy lawyers exert significant influence over the shape of the bankruptcy pro-
cess, and they have a strong incentive to maximize the use of bankruptcy.’’
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In addition,
2 y † (p ) , 2D 2 [A
M 1 a (1 2 b )(x)]
p
2
(otherwise, we are at a minimum), which implies
py † (p ) . D 2 [A
M 1 a (1 2 b )(x)]
p
. (A4)
From equation (A3), the right-hand side of equation (A4) is the marginal social
surplus (MSS).
Renegotiation has two relevant effects: it creates ex post surplus and it alters a









The first term in this equation captures the direct effect of increasing ex post sur-
plus, and the second term captures the indirect effect. The first term is positive be-
cause x 5 AD 2 AM. Also, d(SS)/d p is positive because the social surplus is increas-
ing in the success probability of the borrower. Hence, renegotiation will increase
social surplus when dp /d a is positive. To see when this can happen, totally differ-
entiate equation (A3) with respect to a . Doing this and rearranging terms yields
dp
da
[MSS 2 p y † (p )] 5 2(x)[(1 2 b ) 2 p ]. (A5)
The term inside the braces on the left-hand side of this expression is negative by
equation (A4). Because x is positive, the right-hand side of the expression will be
negative; hence, d p /d a is positive when p , (1 2 b ). In this event, renegotiation
increases social surplus and thus is ex ante efficient. This proves the proposition.
APPENDIX B
Appendix B proves proposition 3. The creditor chooses the interest rate R taking
into account the effect that R will have on the borrower’s choice of effort and hence
on the success probability p (the text shows that an implication of this choice often
is to leave the borrower with some ex ante surplus, and we analyze this case here).
Begin with the borrower’s problem. Given R, the borrower chooses p to maximize
B 1 Y 1 p (y 1 AD 2 R) 1 (1 2 p )[ ab (AD 2 AM)]2 y (p ).
As just said, the lender will choose R such that p . 0, and by our assumption that
y ¢ (1) 5 ¥ , we know that p , 1. Hence, we can assume an interior equilibrium,
with the borrower choosing p to solve the first-order condition
(y 1 AD 2 R) 2 [ab (AD 2 AM)]2 y ¢ (p ) 5 0. (B1)
Since we have assumed that y † (p ) , 0, the borrower’s second-order condition is
satisfied.
Let p *(R; a ) solve equation (B1). Hence, p *(R; a ) is the effort level that a bor-
rower chooses who faces interest rate R and who anticipates renegotiation at level
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a . For convenience, write this effort level as p * and let the derivative of this with
respect to R be p *R R (and so forth). We then get
(a) p *R 5 21
y † (p *), (b) p *a 5
2 b (AD 2 AM)
y † (p *) ,
(c) p *RR 5 2 y -(p *)[y † (p *)]3, (d) p *R a 5
2 b (AD 2 AM)y -(p *)
[y † (p *)]3 .
Our assumptions on y imply that all of these derivatives are negative. To get a
sense of what these mean, a holds that raising R causes p to fall and b holds that
raising a also causes p to fall (because renegotiation is more effective and so the
borrower gets more of the ex post surplus and so works less hard).
We turn now to the creditor’s problem, which is to choose R (anticipating its
effect on p ) to maximize
p *R 1 (1 2 p *)[AM 1 a (1 2 b )(AD 2 AM)]. (B2)
Differentiating equation (B2) with respect to R gives the first-order condition
p * 1 p *R Z 5 0. (B3)
The first term is the marginal gain of raising the interest rate, and the second term
is the marginal cost. Regarding this term, Z is the marginal benefit to the creditor
of the borrower’s success. Formally, Z ; R 2 [AM 1 a (1– b )(AD 2 AM)], and Z
. 0.
Let R*( a ) be the interest rate that solves equation (B3). The issue is how this
equilibrium interest rate varies with a . Totally differentiating equation (B3) with
respect to a and collecting terms yields
R*
a
(p *RRZ 1 2p *R )5 p *R (1 2 b )(AD 2 AM) 2 p *a 2 p *R a Z
5
[b 2 (1 2 b )](AD 2 AM)
y † (p *) 1
b (AD 2 AM)y -(p *)Z
[y † (p *)]3 .
From the derivatives above, we know that ( p *RR Z 1 2p *R ) , 0. Therefore, if b .
(1 2 b ), the right-hand side is positive and R*
a
, 0. On the other hand, if b 5 0,
the right-hand side is negative and R*
a
. 0.
Consider the case when b . (1 2 b ). As a increases, the borrower faces a lower
interest rate in the solvency state and retains a larger share of the surplus in the
insolvency state. Thus, the borrower is better off even if he holds his choice of p
fixed at what now is not the optimum level. Assume next that b 5 0 so that R*
a
.
0. In this case, as a increases, the borrower must pay a higher interest rate in the
solvency state and retains no ex post surplus in the insolvency state. Thus, he is
strictly worse off. By continuity, this result holds for b sufficiently small. This
proves the proposition.
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